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This study examines the impact of CEO duality (a chief executive operating chair of board and 
leader of a firm) of newly privatized Vietnamese firms on the level of corporate entrepreneurship; 
this understanding is used to throw light on the extent to which a position of strategic agility is 
achieved.  Specifically, does CEO duality enable firms to keep consistent with their vision, while 
remaining flexible in their business model?  Data from a survey of 114 CEOs of board and top 
management team members in privatized firms in Vietnam were collected and examined through a 
combination of agency theory and stewardship theory. The research finds that CEO duality does not 
necessarily lead to a higher degree of entrepreneurial activity in privatized Vietnamese firms. The 
results have policy implications for shaping corporate governance, and management implications for 
firms striving to be competitive, in ways that advance corporate entrepreneurship in economies such 
as Vietnam that are both emerging and pursuing privatization. 
 
 





The relatively nascent and emerging literature on strategic agility deals with individual 
firms’ ability to concentrate on achieving their strategic vision, while remaining agile in 
their approach (Lewis et al., 2014).  This imperative is driven by increasingly competitive 
environments, in which a leader’s ability to make decisions quickly is important, but which 
often requires trade-offs with respect of the position held.  This has meant a firm must have 
the ability to sense external ecosystems and internal activity while making the appropriate 
amendments to, or switching between, business models (Doz and Kosonen, 2010).  Despite 
the recent attention to this emerging phenomenon (see for example, Weber and Tarba, 
2014), research has focused on it at a micro-firm level to understand its antecedents and 
influences (Arbussa et al., 2017; Doz and Kosonen, 2010).  However, the desired state 
relating to strategic agility is one attributable to an orientation of groups of firms that are 
striving to achieve.  Hence, this article examines if firms can achieve a strategically agile 
orientation, by which leaders had duality in the position they hold within the governing 
board, while enabling the firm to achieve outcomes that encompass competitive advantage 
and strategic renewal.  Thus, this article examines the impact of chief executives holding 
combined positions in a board on their corporate enterprise performance, and draws insights 
for understanding strategic agility at the macro-economic level (referred loosely herein as 
strategic agility orientation). This is examined by treating components deemed key to 
strategic agility, such as processes and actions, etc, that enable flexibility in a firm’s 
business model, that are also important in corporate entrepreneurship.  The connection is 
made that the conditions of strategic agility will be similar to those of corporate 
entrepreneurship in a transitioning economy as Vietnam, and therefore examining these 
measures of corporate entrepreneurship will enable understanding whether or not CEOs 
3 
 
holding a dual board/chair position represents a strategic agility orientation for the 
Vietnamese firms. 
 To put into technical terms, when chief executive officers (CEOs) go beyond a 
monolithic orientation of board conduct, this is CEO duality, such that a firm allows the 
CEO and board chair positions to be combined (Gove et al., 2017) which enables potential 
swiftness in making decisions.  The benefits and purpose of strategic agility are similar to an 
established concept of corporate entrepreneurship, defined formally as “a process of 
organizational renewal that has three distinct but related dimensions: innovation, venturing, 
and strategic renewal” (Zahra, 1993, p. 321). Corporate entrepreneurship has been argued as 
an important tool for achieving competitive advantage (Covin and Miles, 1999), enhancing 
international performance (Brouthers, Nakos and Dimitratos, 2015), and improving the 
dynamic competencies that underlie firm performance (Wiklund, 1999). Corporate 
entrepreneurship intrinsically involves ideas and initiatives that are new and unproven 
(Brouthers et al., 2015) and thus entails a high degree of risk and uncertainty (Garrett and 
Holland, 2015). This is similar to strategic agility in the way firms strive to respond quickly, 
seize opportunities and change direction.  We argue for the context of Vietnamese firms, 
this is a representative position as their survival conditions warrant the agility. 
These attributes of agility and intended gains raise questions regarding which 
business governance and board-related mechanisms are most appropriate for managing and 
driving corporate entrepreneurship. In particular, there is some debate concerning the extent 
to which corporate entrepreneurship might be affected by the extent of separation from, or 
combination between, the functions of chair and CEO (Connelly, et al, 2010). Yet, there 
remains uncertainty whether combining the roles of chair and CEO (hence, CEO duality) 
stimulates or hampers corporate entrepreneurship. This gap in the extant literature is 
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particularly problematic for informing economic development in transition economies, for 
which the need and motivation to foster entrepreneurship (and achieve a strategically agile 
orientation) are strong.  
This study addresses this gap in the context of a communist transitional emerging 
economy of Vietnam where the dominant nature of business dictates the need to achieve 
attributes representative of a strategic agility orientation.  This context is important for at 
least three other key reasons. First, unlike the majority of research to date on CEO duality 
(e.g., Adrian, Wright and Kilgore, 2017; Gove et al., 2017) that has been undertaken in 
WEIRD (western, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic) economies (Henrich, 
Heine and Norenzayan, 2010), the present study collected data from an eastern emerging 
economy with a young population and fast growth rate of Vietnam. The government has 
substantially modified the institutional arrangements applicable to business (Santarelli and 
Tran, 2012) to facilitate competitive entrepreneurship. Second, Vietnam reformed its system 
of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) by implementing privatization schemes for many but not 
all industries, creating a wide range of ownership structures, so it might be the case that 
achieving a strategically agile orientation is possible in some industries exhibiting various 
characteristics. Given this context, entrepreneurship has been blooming in this emerging 
economy (Nguyen, Sullivan Mort, and D'Souza, 2015). Third, Vietnamese policy makers 
continue to devise laws, regulations, policies and programs to encourage innovation and 
growth (Aubert, 2005).  In this way, Vietnam serves as an applicable and timely setting for 
an empirical investigation of the influence of corporate governance structures on corporate 
entrepreneurship in a developing economy undergoing transition with firms wanting to 
achieve high competitiveness, efficiencies (and thus strategic agility).  Understanding the 
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drivers of corporate entrepreneurship in Vietnam’s dynamic economic setting will inform 
policy makers and interested researchers. 
Three main contributions are offered by the study. First, it advances corporate 
governance research by suggesting that the longstanding and dominating theories, such as 
agency theory or stewardship theory, are not the only that can help predict and explain 
corporate governance in transition economies like Vietnam.  Instead, the present research 
argues that the standard agency-theoretical model alone is inadequate and researchers must 
look to such emerging ideas as strategic agility, and suggests how the impact of CEO duality 
on corporate entrepreneurship in the specific context of Vietnam is representative of a 
strategic agility orientation.  Second, the study provides management and policy insights for 
shaping corporate governance in ways that foster corporate entrepreneurship in privatized 
firms in emerging economies. And last, this study challenges the notion of publication bias – 
namely that journals tend to publish only ‘significant’ results (Homberg and Bui, 2013) 




As Vietnam is a transitioning economy and has undergone significant policy and economic 
restructuring in the past few decades, the focus of research has recently been on how best to 
manage effectively and become competitive, particularly for (mainly privatized) firms 
against their international counterparts.  The idea that firms should try to achieve strategic 
agility has recently emerged to concern the ability of firms to remain on track to achieve 
their strategic objectives while remaining nimble (Doz and Kosonen, 2008).  The more 
recent definition by Weber and Tarba (2014), “the ability of management to constantly and 
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rapidly sense and respond to a changing environment by intentionally making strategic 
moves and consequently adapting the necessary organizational configuration for successful 
implementation” (p.7), which includes key components as processes, actions, structures, 
culture, attributes, skills, and relationships, has close resemblances and gives rise to how it 
can be measured in the form of corporate entrepreneurship.  The similarity is in the items 
used in components of the latter, such as strategic renewal on questions like ‘change of 
competitive approach’, ‘initiate new programs to improve productivity’, etc.  Given the vast 
majority of Vietnamese firms are privatized and smaller enterprises, by understanding these 
firms make it an appropriate group of corporations to research the impact on corporate 
entrepreneurship and how the situation can represent that of strategic agility.  This is a stark 
difference from conventional western research that had preferred single case examples to 
understand the leadership behaviors that represent strategic agility (eg. Doz and Kosonen, 
2008; Arbussa et al., 2017).   
In such research, the roots of strategic agility go back to effective and flexible 
systems, such as those of the Toyota Production System (Adler et al., 1999), and the 
importance to associate with leadership styles (Lewis et al., 2014).  However, what has not 
been researched is the characteristic of CEO duality as a form of leadership style on the 
ability to maintain strategic direction and remain flexible in response to external 
environmental conditions.  A traditional approach has been in the form of agency theory, 
particularly where it is found that remuneration committees of CEOs are more aligned with 
achieving strategic direction for companies with top management board that are more 
outsider-dominated (Conyon and Peck, 1998). 
Agency theory has been the central literature base in many scholarly debates on the 
issue of the effectiveness of CEO duality as an internal governance mechanism (see 
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Eisenhardt, 1989).  Dominating corporate governance research, agency theory assumes 
managers are self-serving, individualistic and bounded by rationality, and may behave 
opportunistically at the expense of the interests of shareholders (ibid). Presumably, the goals 
and risk preferences of shareholders and agent managers are incongruent (Means, 1991), a 
divergence that generates agency costs (Fama, 1980; Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  In this 
way, a system of CEO duality is unlikely to benefit all stakeholders, and decisions made are 
perhaps less in touch with the outside interests of the firm.  The effectiveness of the use of 
agency theory in researching CEO duality and orientations of effectiveness have been 
extensively researched.  For example, Finkelstein and D’Aveni (1994) find that CEO duality 
is most commonplace in situations where leaders do not otherwise have high power, but 
take a more singular role if the firm’s performance is already high. 
 In a similar vein, stewardship theory posits that individuals are motivated not only 
by self-interest and economic considerations but also by self-actualization through intrinsic 
rewards attained through work and the achievement of personal values and goals (Davis, 
Schoorman and Donaldson, 1997a; Donaldson, 1990).  In theory, agents act as an 
organization’s stewards, committed to the attainment of company (and collective) 
objectives. If the interests of the stewards are not aligned with those of the owners, the 
former will “place a higher value on cooperation than defection” (Davis et al., 1997a, p. 24); 
they will be more inclined to prioritize and pursue their organization’s interests (Donaldson 
and Davis, 1991). In principle, managers/leaders act as good stewards of corporate assets 
and are loyal to the company.  Misangyi and Acharya (2014) find the CEO incentive 
alignment depends and success of CEO singularity/duality depends on how well it combines 
with other mechanisms within the governance bundle.  Their exploratory qualitative study 
indicates some governance systems are substitutes and some are complements, but CEO 
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incentives are complementary and support a duality role if the overall governance bundle is 
sound. 
In this way, the present study does not re-research sound contributions on either 
agency or stewardship theories, but borrows their basic premise to guide the core hypothesis 
for the context of transitional economies as the strategic agility literature is more nascent 
and has its close resemblances in this context.  The benefits are because, first, agency theory 
and stewardship theory offer slightly different perspectives on human behavior (Davis et al., 
1997a) which make them complementary rather than competing ideas, as each is more 
applicable to certain executives and situations (Wasserman, 2006); and second, existing 
research on CEO duality is indifferent in the support of either agency theory or stewardship 
theory (Jackling and Johl, 2009), making them neutral in throwing light on understanding 
the impact on corporate entrepreneurship (and strategic agility orientation). 
Context  
Vietnam’s entrepreneurs have historically operated within a hostile institutional 
environment, i.e., in the almost complete absence of formal institutions (Nguyen, 2005), 
making it difficult to be more creative or have the freedom in considering strategically agile 
orientations of business, such as sensing environments (eg. Doz and Kosonen, 2010), etc. 
However, the country’s environment has gradually become more conducive to 
entrepreneurship and the need to reflect external competitive environments, allowing the 
freedom to experiment with business models and leadership orientations that are often seen 
paradoxical (see Ivory and Brooks, 2018).   Vietnam has established herself as a prime 
example of robust growth (McMillan and Woodruff, 2002). Doi Moi has significantly 
facilitated the building of market institutions and infrastructure through various laws and 
regulations and the provision of support for the private sector (Nguyen, 2005). These 
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institutional developments have created a favorable environment for entrepreneurship and 
the number of private enterprises has increased dramatically, from 414 private firms in 1990 
to 69,874 in 2012 (General Statistics Office of Vietnam). By the end of the 2000s, market 
conditions had changed markedly, and access to markets and buyers had become 
increasingly favorable (Steer and Sen, 2010). Undoubtedly, the private sector has played an 
important role in Vietnam’s economic growth and competition models have become key in 
ensuring the firms’ survival. 
Corporate governance in Vietnam is significantly affected by institutional 
arrangements rooted uniquely in the country’s political system and ideology. The corporate 
governance system is regulated by Vietnam’s 1999 Enterprises Law, 2005 Enterprises Law 
and 2005 Securities Law. Vietnamese corporate governance incorporates several different 
legal systems; although Anglo-American company law principles are now becoming 
dominant (Gillespie, 2002), a mix of influences continues. While corporate governance 
standards award the CEOs of privatized firms the power of an agent, this is not the case in 
reality. Many CEOs of privatized Vietnamese firms held a management position in former 
state-owned enterprises (Vu, 2005), before privatization (Gainsborough, 2009). Such CEOs 
may be advantaged in their position in the privatized firm because they understand how the 
business works and have connections with many of the business’ stakeholders. 
Given that the government can retain a considerable proportion of its stake in 
privatized companies, it is appropriate to examine corporate governance in terms of the role 
of the state vis-à-vis the board. Privatized firms can be categorized into three types 
according to the degree of state control: majority share, minority share and no control. 
Where the state owns more than 51 per cent of the capital share, firms are referred to as 
majority shareholding firms; those with less than 51 per cent retained by the state are 
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minority shareholding firms. In majority shareholdings, the controlling agencies appoint the 
directors and have veto power over their appointment. Notably, the Chief Party Secretaries 
(the Communist Party’s ideological leads in those companies) of these agencies also have 
the responsibility for approval of those appointments. Consequently, except for the firms for 
which the state has minority or no share, boards of directors of privatized firms tend to be 
dominated by representatives of the controlling agencies, which include the ministries and 
state capital management agencies or local government. 
 Social culture is another important factor. In Vietnam’s firmly embedded East Asian 
culture, social collectivism is prevalent (Bui and Baruch, 2012). Therefore, the success of 
one’s organization may be considered more important than individual achievements. 
Executives in this context typically have a long tenure, with a commensurately strong 
commitment and sense of duty to the company as a collective organization. Such executives 
may, therefore, feel bound to their company’s performance and take the credit for its 
organizational success. Such success is beneficial to the executives’ careers, making them 
less likely to forego longer-term opportunities for the company for the sake of short-term 
investment returns.  
 In addition, corporate entrepreneurship seems to be fairly new to Vietnamese firms 
due to the history of a close and planning economy. Firms tend to prefer short-term 
approaches based on net profit rather than business growth (Swierczek and Thai, 2003). In 
addition, culturally due to the agriculture of small rice paddles in the North, Vietnamese 
people lack vision for long term development (Tran, 1999).  This questions the extent to 
which a strategically agile orientation can be truly achieved, where the idea is to remain 
forward looking in the form of strategic direction but maintain a flexible business model 
(Arbussa et al., 2017).  In other words, businesses do not tend to invest in long term 
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investment, such as research and development, innovation, or venturing. This can reflect 
onto business where firms lack commitment to corporate entrepreneurship. 
Hypothesis Development 
On the one hand, a suggestion supported by agency theory is that the separation of power 
between CEO and chair is positively related to long-term decision-making, and therefore 
improves firm performance (Barnhart, Marr, and Rosenstein, 1994; Daily and Dalton, 
1994). However, empirical studies provide evidence of a negative effect of CEO duality on 
risk-taking and firm performance. Taking the latter as a dependent variable, this negative 
effect is evident both in developed economies (Ellstrand, Tihanyi, and Johnson, 2002; Kiel 
and Nicholson, 2003; Rechner and Dalton, 1991) and in developing economies such as 
China (Liu, Miletkov, Wei and Yang, 2015). With regard to long-term investment decisions, 
Zahra, Neubaum and Huse (2000) found a negative effect of CEO duality on corporate 
entrepreneurship, suggesting the CEO may behave opportunistically and influence the firm 
to reject investment in corporate entrepreneurship. 
 Privatized firms in Vietnam, emerging as they have from state-owned enterprises and 
moving to an entirely new competitive environment, may be subject to less managerial 
supervision (Bolton, 1995). Fama and Jensen (1983) state that ownership and control are 
more a case of union than separation in young entrepreneurial firms may be more applicable 
to the Vietnamese case; executives of newly privatized firms may see themselves more 
company owners than agents. 
 On the other hand, stewardship theory seems more applicable to organizations in 
which weak control systems dictate trust as the basis of collective and collaborative work 
(Davis, Schoorman, and Donaldson, 1997b). Given the underdeveloped nature of Vietnam’s 
market institutions, trust is more likely to exert a significant force among actors in a 
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business relationship than in an economy where market institutions are better established 
(Nguyen and Rose, 2009). Trusting climates established in these organizations create 
opportunities for CEOs to behave as stewards (Eddleston, Chrisman, Steier, and Chua, 
2010; Van Slyke, 2007).  
  Thus, in a developing context, for a person who has combined roles of CEO and board 
chair, and might act as both ‘agent’ and ‘steward’, those roles are likely to conflict with each 
other, and take most of CEO time and energy to engage effectively in corporate 
entrepreneurship. The following hypothesis is then proposed: 
Hypothesis: In newly privatized firms in Vietnam, CEO duality is negatively 
associated with corporate entrepreneurship.   
Therefore, CEOs who have board chair positions combined are unlikely to represent a 
‘strategically agile’ orientation for Vietnamese firms. 
  
Methodology 
Method and sampling 
The direction and magnitude of relationships between CEO duality and the two dimensions 
of corporate entrepreneurship (innovation and strategic renewal) were analyzed for a sample 
of Vietnamese privatized firms at a single point in time.  The sample population comprised 
all types of privatized firms in Vietnam, including those sold to the public through share 
issues, and firms sold to individuals and organizational investors. The sample was limited to 
firms that had been privatized for at least three years. Moreover, only firms with CEOs who 
had worked for the firm for at least a year at the time of the study were included. 
 To obtain information relating to the variables in the model, a combination of survey 
methods and secondary sources to avoid common method bias (Podsakoff MacKenzie and 
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Podsakoff, 2012) was employed.  A structured questionnaire survey, which collected data 
on the two dimensions of corporate entrepreneurship, was supplemented with archival data 
on board characteristics and ownership structures. These companies’ data were collected 
separately in order to limit the length of the questionnaire. A firm's proxy statements were 
used to collect detailed information about CEOs, chairmen, and board composition. For the 
listed companies, data were obtained through the Internet, while data for non-listed firms 
were collected directly from those firms. The data covered the three-year period from 2010 
to 2012. The total amount of time spent on data collection was a year. 
Because of the challenges of surveying top managers (Cycyota and Harrison, 2002) 
in gathering quantitative data, a convenience sampling method was employed. Since 
convenience sampling risks selection bias (Van Meter, 1990), all possible steps were taken 
to ensure the diversity of board composition, ownership structure, location and size. As mail 
and telephone surveys often have poor response rates, an in-person survey (Patton and 
Baker, 1987) was conducted. Ultimately, 173 CEOs were contacted; 130 CEOs agreed to 
participate in the survey interview; and full data sets from 114 firms were collected. Those 
firms range from small ones (from 15 employees) to large ones (up to 6155 employees) with 
the average of 520.21. 63.2% of participated firms were in largest cities (i.e. Hanoi and Ho 
Chi Minh), and the rest were from smaller cities (i.e. Hai Phong, Can Tho, and Tay Ninh). 
93% participants were male, only 7% female. More than half of them (56.1%) had dual roles 
of CEO and chairman. Their age ranges from 35 to 65 with the average of 51.70 years old. 
93.9% of the participants had undergraduate degrees and above. Their board size ranges 




Given the debate about the definition and measurement of corporate entrepreneurship, the 
relevant literature to select appropriate instruments for use in this study was carefully 
reviewed.  The study adapted two measures developed by Zahra (1996), namely innovation 
and strategic renewal performance (i.e. the two dimensions).  The closeness of how the 
items are close proxies to the defining characteristics of strategic agility by Weber and 
Tarba (2014) is provided at Appendix 1. CEO duality is a dichotomous variable that takes 
the value of 1 if the CEO and board chair are separate individuals; the variable takes the 
value of 0 if the CEO also serves as the company’s board chair.   Guided by previous studies 
on corporate governance and corporate entrepreneurship (e.g., Zahra, 1996; Zahra et al., 
2000), the following control variables were included: firm location, CEO age, gender, tenue 
and qualifications, and board size. Data to operationalize the controls were collected from 
various sources, company websites and company annual reports. 
Analytical procedures 
Correlations among all variables are presented in Table 1. The highest correlation values are 
.52, at the moderate level. The high VIF indicator is 4.12, much lower than the ‘rule of 
thumb’ of 10. Therefore, multi-collinearity is not a concern in this study. The data set was 
also screened to ensure that assumptions of normality were not violated. 
----------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 here 
------------------------------- 
Multiple regression using STATA software to estimate the models was employed.  First, 
this utilized ordinary least squares (OLS) regression for the continuous dependent variables 
(i.e., innovation, strategic renewal performance), computing standard errors that are robust 
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to departures from homoscedasticity. To reduce potential multi-collinearity and enhance the 
interpretability of coefficients, the variables used in the interactions prior to creating the 
product terms (Cohen, Cohen, and Stephen, 2003) were standardized. To address the 
problem of outliers, the results from the robust regression analyses were reported, which 
generates OLS estimates that are robust to the presence of outliers. To protect against multi-
collinearity, the procedures outlined by Neter, Wasserman, and Kutner (1989) were 
followed and variance inflation factors (VIFs) were used to test for collinearity. Checks for 
violations of the assumptions in the regression analyses yielded no substantial concerns.  
 To reduce the noise per degree of freedom, control variables and independent 
variables, respectively, were iteratively tested and parsed. This approach was employed in 
previous studies which tried to preserve degrees of freedom in models with small numbers 
of observations (Bergman and Feser, 2001). The parameters are consistent across alternative 
specifications. In the results, p-values were reported in the main analysis, but the 
traditionally misleading interpretations of ‘statistically significant’ or ‘insignificant’ p-
values were completely removed (Hurlbert, Levine and Utts, 2019). 
 
Results and Discussion 
Separate analyses were conducted for models relating each measure of dependent variable, 
corporate entrepreneurship, namely innovation and strategic renewal performance. Table 2 
shows the regression results. Because of the small sample size (N = 114), the results may 
suffer limitations in terms of statistical power. Therefore, a post hoc analysis was conducted 
to calculate the statistical power for the models that we have tested. The results suggest that 
both models 1 and 2 have observed statistical powers of 1.00, which are above the 
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acceptable threshold of .80 (Hair et al., 2010). Thus, the results do not suffer from this 
limitation. 
----------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 here 
------------------------------- 
 Table 2 shows a number of interesting findings related to CE. First, CEO gender 
does not seem to have any impact on firm’s innovation (β = -.01, p = .90), but slightly have 
impact on firm’s strategic renewal performance (β = .15, p = .10). It means that female 
CEOs tend to have better strategic renewal performance than male counterparts. CEO age 
has positive impact on firm’s innovation (β = .24, p = .04), but negative on firm’s strategic 
renewal performance (β = -.14, p = .22). This means that among the age range of 35 and 65, 
the older CEO is, the more innovation the firm shows. CEO education shows to have 
positive impact on both firms’ innovation (β = .29, p = .00), and firm’s strategic renewal 
performance (β = .19, p = .05). These results show that the higher qualifications that CEOs 
possess, the higher level of corporate entrepreneurship the firms show. Firm’s location has 
negative impact on firms’ innovation (β = -.18, p = .04), but almost no on firm’s strategic 
renewal performance (β = .01, p = .88). This means firms that are located in big cities show 
to be more innovative than those in smaller cities. CEO’s tenure in firm has almost no 
impact on innovation (β = -.05, p = .61), but shows a positive trend toward strategic renewal 
performance (β = .14, p = .19). These results mean CEO’s experience in his/her firm does 
not affect the firm’s innovation, but the longer they had been in the form, the more likely it 
has impact on firm’s strategic renewal performance. The size of the firm shows a trend of 
positive impact on innovation (β = .17, p = .09), i.e. the larger firms are, the more innovative 
they are. This finding contradicts some studies in the literature that the smaller firms are the 
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more innovation they are (e.g. Rogers, 2004). In contrast, size of firms shows almost no 
impact on strategic renewal performance (β = -.00, p = .98). Firm assets show to have 
positive impact on both innovation (β = .16, p = .21), and strategic renewal performance (β 
= .20, p = .14). Similar results are seen with the firms’ trade on stock market (β = .20, p = 
.07; and β = .15, p = .18 respectively); and are the size of the board (β = .13, p = .21; and β = 
.16, p = .15 respectively).   
Second, as it was hypothesized that in newly privatized firms in Vietnam, CEO 
duality is negatively associated with corporate entrepreneurship.  The results show that CEO 
duality has negative impact on firm’s innovation (β = -.13; p = .19), and firm’s strategic 
renewal performance (β = -.12; p = .21). The results show a trend of negative relationships 
between CEO duality and two dimensions of corporate entrepreneurship. Our hypothesis is 
supported, and that CEOs who have board chair position combined are unlikely to represent 
a ‘strategically agile’ orientation for firms, particularly in the context of emerging 
economies like Vietnam. 
 As CEO duality shows a trend to have negative impact on the two measures of 
corporate entrepreneurship, this supports the notion that “organizational changes occur as 
the result of processes that make organizations more similar without necessarily making 
them more efficient” (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, p. 147), which challenges existing 
studies in developed economies (e.g., Zahra et al., 2000).  Furthermore, the complementary 
union of agency and stewardship theories results in no associations between CEO duality 
and corporate entrepreneurship (cf. Le Breton‐ Miller and Miller, 2009), possibly because 





So, what does this mean for understanding strategic agility, and if Vietnamese firms operate 
such an orientation?  As the empirical study finds that CEO duality tends to have negative 
impact on corporate entrepreneurship, it would suggest that from a macro-economic level, 
Vietnamese firms would not be operating a strategic agility orientation of keeping strategic 
direction and averse of competitive environmental conditions.  This would also imply, 
CEOs operating dual roles may not respectively represent the specific acts of achieving 
strategic direction by leading the firm and reflecting on the external environment as director 
of its board. Both theoretical and practical implications of this study are discussed below. 
Theoretical implications 
This study is consistent with Filatotchev's (2008) idea that there is no universal “best way” 
to achieve corporate governance effectiveness; each institutional environment is distinctive. 
Borrowing usefully from stewardship theory and agency theory has helped explain for the 
context of Vietnam that CEO duality is actually indifferent to corporate entrepreneurship.  
This finding is important in terms of theory development for two reasons. First, 
researchers in governance, corporate entrepreneurship and strategic orientation might need 
to understand the phenomenon in the context of fast developing economy with a communist 
political system differently. In other words, CEO duality does not help corporate 
entrepreneurship in such a context where many top managers have worked for state-owned 
companies and the power of the state is still large in the economy (Nguyen and van Dijk, 
2012). Second, our study seems to show that the contextual factors, such as the economy’s 
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history and societal culture might possibly lend insightful explanations, which need further 
studying in the area. 
Though not fully, our study also partly reveals some insight into the applicability of 
stewardship theory, suggesting that it might be more applicable in the early stage, right after 
the privatization to set the corporate entrepreneurship direction for the firm. This insight is 
consistent with the argument that young ventures are less control-oriented than more mature 
ones, so stewardship theory is better applied to new ventures than to mature ones 
(Wasserman, 2006).  For the context of strategic agility, this suggests that business models 
should be set up early on before firms become more established making it difficult to adjust 
after a while in operation. 
Practical implications  
One of the practical implications of this study is to increase the awareness of the importance 
of corporate entrepreneurship among businesses in Vietnam. This helps them plan for 
strategic development with a focus on innovation and competitive strategic renewal. 
In addition, the findings have important implications for Vietnam and its efforts to 
employ a modern corporate governance model when issuing policies for public companies, 
and similar developing country contexts. Our findings call for special attention to the current 
trend of non-CEO duality and independent external directors in legacy. The government may 
need to review policies relating to corporate governance applied to public firms because 
those policies might not have stemmed from the practice of Vietnamese firms. 
In addition, the government should make substantial improvements in external 
corporate governance mechanisms, as suggested by Walsh and Seward (1990), because 
internal governance is only a part of a larger bundle of governance practices (Yoshikawa, 
Zhu, and Wang, 2015); this is the essence of strategic agility.  Instead of forcing firms to 
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adopt common rules, the government should strive to strengthen external corporate 
governance, such as developing strong capital markets, building effective markets for 
corporate control and active take-over markets, and issuing strong regulations to protect 
small investors, so that at least the external environment resembles more closely Western 
ones that are more open to competitive dynamics.  
Lastly, this study suggests there are disadvantages when having two roles held by 
one person, suggesting that CEO duality has a negative impact on corporate 
entrepreneurship.  CEO duality seems to be contingent on organizational factors (Boyd, 
1995) or on environmental factors (Peng at el., 2007). As such, based on the specific context 
of each firm, the firms should choose the appropriate mechanisms that suit them, rather than 
just follow ‘the best practices’ elsewhere. CEO duality is likely to diminish the prospect of 
strategic agility.  Vietnamese managers might also usefully recognize from the results that 
female managers better facilitate strategic renewal, and other control variables that might 
have positive impact on innovation are firms’ trade on the stock market, CEO age, education 
and favorable locations (i.e. big cities).  These factors have yet to feature in the strategic 
agility literature, despite micro-foundational attributes like sense making and ability to seize 
opportunities (Doz and Kosenon, 2008). 
Limitations and future research 
Remaining limitations in the methodology should be kept in mind when interpreting the 
study’s findings and contributions. First, the cross-sectional approach does not allow for 
causal inferences to be made from the endogenously chosen governance, ownership and 
outcome variables. Future research could employ longitudinal data, which may offer new 
insights into the complex relationships among corporate governance, corporate 
entrepreneurship and strategic agility. Second, as this study focuses only on privatized firms, 
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the results may not be generalized to other types of firm which do not exhibit similar 
characteristics. In general, board dynamics in public firms may be different from those in 
privatized firms. Third, as this study is based on a single country, one should be cautious 
about generalizing the findings to other contexts. Future research is needed to determine 
whether the constructs and measures used here are appropriate for other transition 
economies. Indeed, as entrepreneurial activities are complicated and vary significantly, the 
same measures should not be used in all types of research (Zahra and Wright, 2011). For 
example, as investments in research and development are rare in Vietnam, the inclusion of 
this item in the innovation construct makes it difficult to validate the measures. Moreover, as 
suggested by Tian and Lau (2001), it is essential to develop better concepts and measures of 
corporate governance in relation to specific countries.  Lastly, this study has used its 
attributes to liken the loose conditions of strategic agility which are relatively nascent in 
literature, the contributions of which should be interpreted with a degree of caution even if 
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Table 1: Correlations between Variables 
 
Variable Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Innovation 2.32 1.28 (.85)          
2. Strategic Renewal 3.55 1.16 .56 (.74)         
3. CEO duality .59 .51 -.12 -.23         
4. CEO gender 1.07 .26 .11 .23 -.11        
5. CEO age 51.96 7.53 -.01 -.24 .25 -.02       
6. CEO education 3.13 .53 .30 .26 .04 .06 -.31      
7. CEO tenure 19.12 10.00 .05 .07 .05 .03 .49 -.14     
8. Firm location 2.43 1.11 -.36 -.18 .15 -.03 .15 -.21 .02    
9. Trade on stock 
market 
.30 .46 .33 .30 -.23 .19 .06 .02 .12 -.12   
10. Board size 4.94 1.47 .33 .37 -.13 .16 -.05 .07 .20 -.15 .41 .03 













Strategic Renewal Performance 
(Model 2) 
β  ɛ p β ɛ p 
Intercept  2.56 .06  2.4 .51 
Control       
CEO gender -. 01 .42 .90 .15 .39 .10 
CEO age .24 .02 .04 -.14 .02 .22 
CEO education .29 .22 .00 .19 .21 .05 
CEO experience in firm -.05 .01 .61 .14 .01 .19 
Firm size  .17 .00 .09 -.00 .00 .98 
Firm location -.18 .11 .04 .01 .10 .88 
Firm assets .16 .20 .21 .20 .19 .14 
Trade on stock market .20 .30 .07 .15 .28 .18 
Board size .13 .09 .21 .16 .09 .15 
       
CEO duality -.13 .25 .19 -.12 .23 .21 
       
R2 .36      .33   
F 1.7      1.6   




Appendix 1: Corporate entrepreneurship (CE) scale and association with strategic 
agility 
CE Dimensions CE Survey Items 
 
Strategic agility characteristics 
Innovation You spent heavily (well above your 
industry average) on research and 
development 
 
(Cronbach Alpha is .85) processes, vision 
  You introduced a large number of new 
products/services to the market 
nimbleness 
  You pioneered the development of the 
products/services that are NEW to the 
firm and NEW to the Vietnamese market 
skills, relationships 
Strategic renewal 
You changed your competitive approach 
(strategy) for business units  
nimbleness, flexibility 
(Cronbach Alpha is .74) 
You initiated several programs to 
improve the productivity of your 
business units 
attributes, structure 
  You reorganized operations to ensure 
increased coordination and 
communication among your business 
units 
processes, actions, structures 
 
 
